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Abstract. We prove in a non-black-box way that every bounded list and set com-
mitment scheme is knowledge-binding. This is a new and rather strong security
condition, which makes the security deﬁnitions for time-stamping much more
natural compared to the previous deﬁnitions, which assume unpredictability of
adversaries. As a direct consequence, list and set commitment schemes with par-
tial opening property are sufﬁcient for secure time-stamping if the number of
elements has an explicit upper bound N. On the other hand, white-box reduc-
tions are in a sense strictly weaker than black-box reductions. Therefore, we also
extend and generalize the previously known reductions. The corresponding new
reductions are Θ(
√
N) times more efﬁcient, which is important for global-scale
time-stamping schemes where N is very large.
1 Introduction
Commitment schemes are basic building blocks in numerous cryptographic protocols.
The most importantproperties of commitmentschemes are binding and hiding. A com-
mitment is hidingif it reveals no informationabout the committedmessage and binding
if it is impossible to change the committed message afterwards without detection. First
such schemes for committing a single bit were proposed by Blum [4] and by Bras-
sard et al [5] and were proven secure under the hardness of factoring assumption. Later
works have signiﬁcantly improved their efﬁciency and weakened the underlying com-
plexity theoretic assumptions, see [14,10] for further references. Here, we study the
so called partially releasable commitments, in which one can compute a commitment
(also called digest) for a list X = (x1,...,xN) of bit-strings, so that it is possible to
partially open the commitment for every xi ∈ X without disclosing the other elements
of X. For opening xi it is sufﬁcient to present a decommitment string si (also called
certiﬁcate). Achieving the hiding property is somewhat trivial, as one can always add
another layer of commitments. Hence, our main emphasis is on the binding property.
List commitments [3,1,17] that are only binding are known as one-way accumulators.
⋆ Partially supported by Estonian SF grant no. 6944, and by EU FP6-15964: “AEOLUS”.
⋆⋆ Partially supported by Finnish Academy of Sciences, and by Estonian Doctoral School in
Information and Communication Technologies.In particular, we analyze the security of a time-stamping protocol, where clients
send their requests x1,...,xN to a Time-Stamping Server (TSS) who computes the
commitment c and sends the corresponding certiﬁcates s1,...,sN back to the clients.
If c is published in an authentic way then everybody can verify that xi was generated
before c was published. This principle is used in practical time-stamping schemes [12]
where c is computed as the root of a hash tree. List commitment schemes were be-
lieved to be exactly what one needs for such kind of time-stamping. However, Buldas
et al [7] pointed out a ﬂaw in the security proof of [12]. By giving a carefully crafted
oracle separation they showed that pure collision-resistance is insufﬁcient to prove that
the hash tree time-stamping schemes [12] are secure. In other words, either there are
collision-resistant functions that are still insecure for time-stamping, or the security of
time-stamping schemes follows from currently unknown complexity-theoretic results.
The key point of this paradoxical result is that the number of committed elements is
potentially unbounded.In Sec. 4, we prove that all list and set commitments, where the
cardinality of X has an explicit bound |X| ≤ N, are suitable for time-stamping. The
proof is given in the exact security framework and is Θ(
√
N) times more efﬁcient than
the previous reduction [7]. This improvement is especially valuable for global-scale
time-stamping schemes in which N is very large.
InSec.5,weshowthatallbindingboundedlistandsetcommitmentsareknowledge-
binding. This is a new and extremely strong security requirement inspired from the se-
curity of time-stamping schemes. Its strength is comparable to the plaintext awareness
property, which is deﬁned for public key encryption. The knowledge-binding property
is also much more intuitive requirement for time-stamping schemes than the previous
ones [7,9], which use unpredictable probability distributions to model the stream of
“new documents” sent to a TSS. Roughly, the knowledge-binding property states that
for every efﬁcient TSS, it is possible (by observing the commitment procedure) to efﬁ-
ciently extract the list X of all documents that can be opened by the TSS in the future.
The dedicated extractor must know only the internal coin tosses of TSS and some pub-
lic parameters. Consequently, even if the TSS is malicious, it must know the whole list
X before the correspondingcommitment is published. This allows to prove the security
in the classical ideal vs real world comparison framework [11, pp.622–631,697–700].
Moreover, the notion of knowledge-binding commitments can be useful in other
cryptographic protocols, because the ability to open a commitment does not change in
time and we may skip the proofs of knowledge in the commitment phase. On the other
hand, the corresponding security proofs are not black box. This means that once we
have an efﬁcient adversary A that breaks the knowledge-binding condition we know
that there exists an efﬁcient adversary A′ that breaks the binding property of the corre-
sponding commitment scheme. However, we may have no efﬁcient ways to construct
A′. Therefore, in reality the knowledge-binding property can be violated but the com-
mitment scheme may still be practically binding—the efﬁcient breaking procedure ex-
ists but is not known. Black-box security proofs in turn give an efﬁcient procedure for
constructingA′ fromA. In this sense, Theorems1–4givesubstantially strongersecurity
guarantees for a ﬁxed hash function (e.g. SHA-1) than Theorems 5 and 6.
InSec. 6, we brieﬂydiscuss aboutotherpossibleapplicationsofknowledge-binding
such as distributed and ﬁne-grained time-stamping.Some of the details of this work have been omitted because of space limitations.
The missing details will be published in the IACR ePrint Archive.
2 Preliminaries and Notation
We use a non-uniform model of computations, where each algorithm A is speciﬁed as
an input of a universal multi-tape Turing machine U that ﬁrst copies the code of A to
its working-tape and then starts to interpret it. A is a t-time algorithm if U performs at
most t elementary operations to interpret the code of A independent of the input of A.
By x ← D we mean that x is chosen randomly according to a distribution D.
In particular, if A is an algorithm, then x ← A(y) means that x is chosen accord-
ing to the output distribution of A on an input y. Finite sets are identiﬁed with the
corresponding uniform distributions, e.g., x ← {0,1}
ℓ means that x is a uniformly
chosen ℓ-bit string. If D1,...,Dm are distributions and F(x1,...,xm) is a predi-
cate, then Pr[x1 ← D1,...,xm ← Dm : F(x1,...,xm)] denotes the probability that
F(x1,...,xm) is true after the ordered assignment of x1,...,xm.
By a cryptographic primitive P we mean a set of computable functions associated
with the advantage function AdvP( ), such that for every adversarial algorithm A, the
advantage AdvP(A) is a positive real number. Mostly, AdvP(A) is deﬁned as the non-
trivial success (scaled probability) in certain game sec that captures the desired prop-
erties of P. A primitive P is said to be (t,ε)-secure in terms of sec if Adv
sec
P (A) ≤ ε
for every t-time adversary A. For example, by a (t,ε)-secure collision-resistant hash
function we mean a pair H = (Gen,h) of algorithms such that if pk ← Gen is an
arbitrary output of the generation function then h(pk, ) = hpk( ) is a function of type
{0,1}ℓ → {0,1}m where ℓ > m; and for every t-time adversary A :
Adv
coll
H (A) = Pr[pk←Gen,(x1,x2)←A(pk) : x1  = x2 ∧ hpk(x1) = hpk(x2)] ≤ ε .
Time-success ratio. Quite often it is suitable for adversaries to ﬁnd a trade-offbetween
plausible attacking-time t and the corresponding advantage ε(t) against P. If the min-
imum time-success ratio for P is αP, then ε(t) ≤ t
αP by deﬁnition. Often, we cannot
estimate anything else about P than αP. Now, any black- or white-box reduction intro-
duces a change ratio γ = α1
α0 where α0 is the time-success ratio of the basic primitive
and α1 is the ratio of the derived primitive, i.e., we have established a new approximate
bound ε1(t) ≤ t
γα0. Therefore, large values of γ provide better approximatingbounds.
Sampling bounds. Our proofs use several standard statistical bounds. Let X1,...,Xm
be identicallydistributed independentzero-onerandomvariables with   = Pr[Xi = 1]
and let X =
 m
i=1 Xi. Then for any 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1 the Chernoff bounds [13]
Pr[X ≤ (1 − θ) m] ≤ e−θ
2m /2 , and Pr[X ≥ (1 + θ) m] ≤ e−θ
2m /3 .
We alsoneeda Birthdayboundtodeterminethecollisionprobability.LetY1,...,Ym be
identicallybutarbitrarilydistributedindependentrandomvariableswith possiblevalues
{1,...,N}. Then the probability p that all Yi-s are different satisﬁes p ≤ e−
m(m−1)
2N . In
particular, if m ≥ 1.5
√
N and N ≥ 9 then p ≤ 1
2.3 Partially Releasable Commitment Schemes
Set and list commitments. Most commitment schemes for ℓ-bit strings facilitate only
complete disclosure of the committed input. In the context of time-stamping, the com-
plete input can be several gigabytes long whereas we actually need to disclose only a
few hundred bits. Therefore, we study commitment schemes that facilitate partial dis-
closure of inputs.List commitments are order-preserving:committedstrings are ordered
tuples. Set commitments in turn do not provide any ordering. Like ordinary commit-
ment schemes, these commitments are speciﬁed by four basic algorithms: Gen, Com,
Cert and Ver. Initialization algorithm Gen generates public parameters pk. Elements
(m1,...,mn) are committed by computing (c,d) ← Compk(m1,...,mn), where the
commitment c is sent to the receiver and d is kept by the sender for later use. To prove
that mi was indeed used to compute the commitment c, the sender generates a certiﬁ-
cate5 s ← Certpk(d,mi) the validity of which can be tested with the Ver algorithm.
The commitment scheme is functional if for any (c,d) ← Compk(m1,...,mn) and
s ← Certpk(d,mi), the veriﬁcationresult Verpk(c,n,mi,s) = true with overwhelming
probability. For list commitments, the certiﬁcate s contains also the exact location i of
the decommitted element, denoted as loc(s) = i. We explicitly assume that a decom-
mitment certiﬁcate for a set X = {x1,...,xr} is a union of the corresponding element
certiﬁcates s1,...,sr denoted by s1 ∪...∪sr. Consequently, certiﬁcates can be freely
joined togetherand split into sub-certiﬁcates. For many commitmentschemes such lists
can further be compressed but this is only an implementation detail.
We omit the formal deﬁnition of the hiding property, since we study only the fea-
tures related to the binding property. The binding property is different for set and list
commitments. For list commitments, the binding property is violated if an adversary
can open the i-th element in two different ways:
Adv
bind(A) = Pr



pk ← Gen, (c,n,x0,s0,x1,s1) ← A(pk) :
x0  = x1 ∧ loc(s0) = loc(s1)
∧ Verpk(c,n,x0,s0) = Verpk(c,n,x1,s1) = true


 , (1)
where the probability is taken over the coin tosses of all relevant algorithms. Since
certiﬁcates are closed under union and there is no ordering for set commitments, the
only way to misbehave is to exceed the size of X:
Adv
bind(A) = Pr
 
pk ← Gen, (c,n,X,s) ← A(pk) :
Verpk(c,n,X,s) = true ∧ |X| > n
 
, (2)
where Verpk(c,n,X,s) ﬁrst splits X and s into components and then veriﬁes each com-
ponent xi ∈ X separately by using the corresponding component-certiﬁcate si ∈ s.
We say that the commitment scheme is (τ,ε)-binding if for all τ-time adversaries
Adv
bind(A) ≤ ε. For unboundedadversaries, we speak about statistical ε-binding.
Note that set and list commitments must explicitly specify the number n of the
committedelements.Indeed,if thecertiﬁcates donotrevealthesize ofthecommitment,
5 To be precise, Cert should return a vector of certiﬁcates for each location of mi in the list.a malicious adversary can just hide some committed elements and receivers can never
be sure if the commitment is fully opened. A commitment scheme is N-bounded if
Verpk(c,n,x,s) = false for all n > N.
List commitmentschemes that satisfy onlythe bindingpropertiesareknownas one-
way accumulators [1,3,17]. One-way accumulators that in addition to positive state-
ments x ∈ X also allow to (compactly) prove negative statements x  ∈ X are called
undeniable attesters [6]. The commonly used binding requirement for one-way accu-
mulators is n-times collision-freeness [1], which is equivalent to the binding property
of set commitments.
Time-stamping schemes. Time-stamping protocols process documents in batches X1,
X2,X3,... that we call rounds.The roundscorrespondto time periods of ﬁxed duration
(one hour, one day, etc.) After the i-th period,a short commitmentci of the correspond-
ing batch Xi is published. A document x ∈ Xi precedes document y, if there is j > 0
suchthat y ∈ Xi+j.Obviously,fora ﬁxedcommitmentci theremustbean efﬁcientway
to prove that x ∈ Xi. However, for documents y  ∈ Xi such proofs must be infeasible to
create. Note that ci can be viewed as a classical set or list commitment to the set Xi and
the corresponding proof of x ∈ Xi as a certiﬁcate. Therefore, time-stamping schemes
share the same functionality and algorithmic description as the set and list commitment
schemes. Such a structural similarity is indeed remarkable. Still, careful studies of the
security requirements reveal considerable differences between time-stamping and com-
mitment schemes. Different security deﬁnitions exist for time-stamping schemes [7–9,
12]. In this paper, we adapt the strongest6 deﬁnition [9] for the non-uniform precise
security framework with minor modiﬁcations in notations.
Formaldeﬁnitionsoftime-stampingschemesdonotrequirethatnisexplicitlygiven
as an argument to the veriﬁcation algorithm Ver, but negative results in [7] suggest
that time-stamping schemes (at least those without additional third parties) must be
bounded, i.e., n has to be at least implicitly speciﬁed.
Intuitively,time-stampingschemesmust be secureagainst“back-dating”andthis it-
self raises a subtle issue: How to model the future? Most works [7–9] have taken an ap-
proachbasedoncomputationalentropy.Documentgenerationis modeledas anefﬁcient
randomized procedure and the security guarantees are given for document distributions
with high enough computational entropy. More formally, an adversary A = (A1,A2) is
(τ,δ)-unpredictable if for every τ-time predictor Π :
Adv
upr
A (Π) = Pr
 
ω1 ←  ,pk ← Gen, ˆ x ← Π(pk,ω1),
(c,n,φ) ← A1(pk;ω1),(x,s) ← A2(φ) : ˆ x = x
 
≤ δ ,
where ω1 denotes the random coins of A1 and the probability is taken over the coin
tosses of all relevant algorithms. The second stage A2 of the adversary models an efﬁ-
cient document generation (back-dating) procedure.
6 There exist stronger security deﬁnitions for time-stamping schemes with additional (auditing)
parties [8]. The main drawback of those schemes is a large amount of extra communication.Deﬁnition 1 (Entropy based security). A time-stamping scheme is (t,τ,δ,ε)-secure
if for every (τ,δ)-unpredictable t-time A :
Adv
ts(A) = Pr
 
ω1 ←  ,pk ← Gen,(c,n,φ) ← A1(pk;ω1),
(x,s) ← A2(φ) : Verpk(c,n,x,s) = true
 
≤ ε . (3)
Here,δ quantiﬁesatrivialadvantage.Indeed,considerthenextadversaryA = (A1,A2):
– A1(pk;ω1) computes (c,d) ← Compk(ˆ x) and the corresponding valid certiﬁcate
s ← Certpk(c, ˆ x) and outputs a tuple (c,1,(ˆ x,s)).
– A2(ˆ x,s) generates a random x so that x = ˆ x with probability δ, and outputs (x,s).
For every τ the adversary A is (τ,δ)-unpredictable. However, no matter how the time-
stamping scheme is deﬁned, the advantage Adv
ts(A) of A is at least δ. Hence, it is
reasonable to assume that δ ≪ ε. Moreover, as log 1
δ is an upper bound for the compu-
tational R´ enyi entropy, we implicitly assume that the computational Shannon entropy
of the future documents is at least log 1
δ w.r.t. the time-bound τ.
The biggest drawback of the entropy based deﬁnition is non-uniformity. The se-
curity deﬁnition is natural in the polynomial model but has some ﬂaws when adapted
to the exact model. It only offers protection against (τ,δ)-unpredictable adversaries!
Hence, it does not exclude extremely successful adversaries that are just not quite so
unpredictable. In theory, a time-stamping scheme could be protected against (τ,δ)-
unpredictableadversariesbut still be totally insecure against(τ,δ+δ100)-unpredictable
adversaries. This ﬂaw can be ﬁxed by requiring strong uniformity in the deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 2 (Black-box security). A time-stamping scheme is (t,τ,ε)-secure if there
exists a τ-time black-box extractor machine K such that for every t-time A :
Adv
ts(A) = Pr



ω1 ←  ,pk ← Gen, ˆ X ← KA(pk;ω1, )(pk),
(c,n,φ) ← A1(pk;ω1), (x,s) ← A2(φ) :
(Verpk(c,n,x,s) = true ∧ x  ∈ ˆ X) ∨ |ˆ X| > n


 ≤ ε , (4)
where ω1 denotes random coins of A1 and K gets a black-box access to A1(pk;ω1) and
A2(φ; ). The working time of KA(pk;ω1, ) includes the time needed to execute all oracle
calls. For list commitments, we treat ˆ X as a list and write x ∈ ˆ X iff x = ˆ X[loc(s)].
Intuitively, we state that malicious time-stamping servers cannot issue valid cer-
tiﬁcates for unknown documents, as there exists a well known algorithm KA(pk;ω1, )
for efﬁciently reconstructing the list of all valid documents ˆ X. This algorithm can be
automatically constructed for every t-time adversary.
It is straightforward to see that (t,τ,ε)-secure time-stamping scheme is always
(t,τ,δ,ε + Nδ) secure where N ≥| X |, as one can use K in prediction. In Sec. 4,
we prove that every binding N-bounded list commitment scheme is also a secure time-
stamping scheme. Still, there are quantitative differences between these two notions.
Practical constructions based on hash trees. Merkle trees [15] and count-certiﬁed
hash trees [16] (described below) constructed from collision-resistant hash functionsare binding but not hiding even if the hash function is modeled as a random oracle—a
release of an element (a leaf node) also reveals one neighboring element (the sibling
leaf node). Nevertheless, if we use Merkle trees to compute a short commitment from
hiding and binding commitments, we get binding and hiding list and set commitments.
x1 x3 x2 x4
x12
x14
x34 h(x1x2) →
h(x12x34) →
h(x3x4) →
x1 x2
x12 x3
1
1 2
1
h(1x1x21) →
h(2x12x31) → x13
Fig.1. Merkle hash tree for {x1,x2,x3,x4} and a count-certiﬁed hash tree for {x1,x2,x3}.
AMerklehashtreeforalist Xis abinarytreetheleavesofwhicharetheelementsof
X and each non-leaf node is a hash of its two children (Fig. 1, left). Nodes with a single
child can be avoided. Hence, every non-leaf node is assumed to have two children.
Acount-certiﬁedhashtree (Fig.1,right)is abinarytreewhichis similar toaMerkle
tree, except that its arcs are labeled with counters each of which equal to the number of
leaves in the corresponding subtree. Each non-leaf vertex v is a hash h(nLxLxRnR),
where nL and nR are the counters of the left- and the right subtree respectively. The
counter c of the unique outgoing arc of v is the sum nv = nL + nR.
Each hash tree can be represented as a commitment function (c,X) ← Compk(X),
where c is the root hash value of the corresponding tree and pk denotes the public
parameters associated with the collision-resistant hash function h. By the certiﬁcate
Certpk(X,xi) for xi ∈ X we mean the smallest amount of data needed to recomputethe
root hash value. For example, in the Merkle hash tree (Fig. 1, left) the certiﬁcate s2 for
x2 is s2 = ((x1, ),( ,x34)) which represents a sequence of hashingsteps starting from
the leaf x2 and ending with the root hash value, whereas denotes an empty slot which
duringthe veriﬁcationis ﬁlled with thehash ofthepreviouspair. Similarly,in the count-
certiﬁed hash tree (Fig. 1, right) the certiﬁcate for x2 is s2 = ((1,x1, ,1),(2, ,x3,1)).
The veriﬁcation functionVerpk(c,n,x,s) simply recomputes the root hash value by us-
ing s and compares it with c. It also checks whether n ≤ N. The veriﬁcation algorithm
for count-certiﬁed trees also recomputes the intermediate counter values to verify the
certiﬁcate s, in particular if the counter of the root vertex is n.
Collision-Extraction Property. For hash trees with a ﬁxed shape and count-certiﬁed
hashtreesthereisastraightandprecisereductionofthebindingpropertytothecollision-
resistance of h because of the following property: If x0  = x1, Verpk(c,n,x0,s0) =
Verpk(c,n,x1,s1) = true, and loc(s0) = loc(s1), then the internal h-calls of these
two veriﬁcations comprise a collision for h. Moreover, if the tree is balanced, then the
collision can be extracted in O(|s0| + |s1|) = O(log2 N) time.1. Execute A1 in a black-box way and store (c,n,φ) ← A1(pk;ω1).
2. Generate m independent samples (x1,s1) ← A2(φ),...,(xm,sm) ← A2(φ).
3. Output (c,n) and a set of valid pairs V = {(xi,si) : Verpk(c,n,xi,si) = true}.
Fig.2. Black-box certiﬁcate extractor K
A
cert(m).
4 Bounded Commitments are Sufﬁcient for Time-Stamping
In this section, we prove that bounded commitment schemes with partial opening are
sufﬁcient to construct secure time-stamping schemes. The new security reductions use
a simple black-box certiﬁcate extractor (Fig. 2) and in the proofs we just show that a
big enough set of valid decommitments V allows to break the binding property.
Our proofs do not only generalize the existing ones [7] but are also more efﬁcient.
Presented theorems together with the previous separation results [7,9] provide a clear
border between the well studied classical binding properties like collision-freeness and
thepropertiesneededfortime-stamping.Forboundedcommitmentschemesthebinding
property implies time-stamping security. Otherwise, these notions are independent—
binding properties are not necessary [9] nor sufﬁcient [7].
To clarify the presentation, we have omitted a small O(N logN + t) term that
counts the computational effort needed to manage the list V of valid decommitments,
as the contribution to the total working time is irrelevant for all reasonable values of ε.
To be absolutely precise, one has to increase the time-bounds for the binding property
by O(N logN + t) in Theorems 1–4.
Theorem 1 (Entropy based security). Every
 
6t
√
N
ε , ε
8
 
-binding and N-bounded list
commitment scheme is also a
 
t,t, ε
3
432 N,ε
 
-secure time-stamping scheme for N ≥ 9.
Proof. Let A = (A1,A2) be a t-time adversary that violates
 
t,t, ε
3
432 N,ε
 
-security
promise, i.e., Adv
ts(A) ≥ ε and A2 is sufﬁciently unpredictable (even for itself):
Pr[Coll] := Pr
 
pk ← Gen,(c,n,φ) ← A1(pk;ω),
(x0,s0) ← A2(φ),(x1,s1) ← A2(φ) : x0 = x1
 
≤
ε3
432N
.
If m = 6
√
N
ε then the black-box certiﬁcate extractor KA
cert(m) runs in time 6t
√
N
ε and
provides enoughcertiﬁcates to reveal a double opening.Let Coll
∗ denote that two equal
messages xi = xj are produced internally by KA
cert(m). Then by the union bound
Pr[Coll
∗] ≤
 
pk,ω1
Pr[pk,ω1]  
m(m − 1)
2
  Pr[Coll|pk,ω1]
≤
m(m − 1)
2
  Pr[Coll] ≤
m2
2
 
ε3
432N
≤
ε
24
.
Next, we estimate the number of valid document-certiﬁcate pairs created by KA
cert(m).
Let εpk,ω1 = Adv
ts(A|pk,ω1) denote the probability that A is successful for ﬁxed pkand ω1. As Pr
 
pk ← Gen,ω1 ←   : εpk,ω1 ≥ ε
2
 
≥ ε
2, we apply the Chernoff bound
for these (pk,ω1) pairs with θ = 1
2 and Xi indicating (xi,si) ∈ V, and get
Pr[|V| ≤ 1.5
√
N|εpk,ω1 ≥ ε
2] ≤ e
− 3
√
N
8 < 1/3 .
Since V consists of identically distributed independentvariables, we apply the Birthday
bound. If |V| ≥ 1.5
√
N then loc(si) = loc(sj) for some i,j with probability > 1
2. Let
C be an adversarythat runs KA
cert(m) and then tries to ﬁnd a double openingin V. Then
Adv
bind(C) ≥
ε
2
 
 
1 − e− 3
√
N
8
 
 
1
2
− Pr[Coll
∗] >
ε
6
−
ε
24
=
ε
8
for N ≥ 9 and we have obtained a desired contradiction. ⊓ ⊔
Theorem 2 (Entropy based security). Every
 
4Nt
ε , ε
8
 
-binding and N-bounded set
commitment scheme is a
 
t,t, ε
3
64N2,ε
 
-secure time-stamping scheme for N ≥ 6.
Proof. Similarly to the previous proof, let A = (A1,A2) be a t-time adversary that
violates a
 
t,t, ε
3
64N2,ε
 
-time-stamping security promise. In other words, Adv
ts(A) ≥
ε and Pr[Coll] ≤ ε
3
64(N+1)2. Fix m = 4N
ε . Then the black-box certiﬁcate extractor
C := KA
cert(m) then runs in time 4Nt
ε . The Chernoff bound with θ = 1
2 yields
Pr
 
|V| ≤ N|εpk,ω1 ≥ ε
2
 
≤ e− N
4 < 1/2 .
Again, Pr
 
pk ← Gen,ω1 ←   : εpk;ω ≥ ε
2
 
≥ ε
2 and we have obtained a contradic-
tion: Adv
bind(C) ≥ ε
2  
 
1 − e− N
4
 
− Pr[Coll
∗] > ε
4 − m
2
2   ε
3
64N2 = ε
8. ⊓ ⊔
Theorem 3 (Uniform security). Every (2Nt
ε , ε
2)-binding and N-bounded list commit-
ment scheme is also (t, 2Nt
ε ,ε)-black-box secure time-stamping scheme.
Proof. For the proof we have to ﬁx a canonical black-box extractor machine KA:
1. First run A1 and store (c,n,φ) ← A1(pk;ω1) and set ˆ X[i] = ⊥ for i ∈ {1,...,n}.
2. Fix m = 2N
ε and for k ∈ {1,...,m} do
– Compute an independent sample (xk,sk) ← A2(φ).
– If Verpk(c,n,xk,sk) = true and ˆ X[loc(sk)] = ⊥ then set ˆ X[loc(sk)] = xk.
3. Output the last snapshot of ˆ X.
Clearly, for every t-time adversary A = (A1,A2), the extraction algorithm KA runs in
time 2Nt
ε and the extractor K is valid for the deﬁnition.
For the sake of contradiction, assume that a t-time adversary A = (A1,A2) violates
the security promise (4) w.r.t. K. Let a pair (xk,sk) be revealing if xk  = ˆ X[loc(sk)] in
Step 2 of KA. Then the probability that (xk,sk) is revealing must be larger than ε for
every k ∈ {1,...,m}, since the previousstate of ˆ X can be viewed as a partial output of
KA. Let Xk be the corresponding zero-one indicator variable, i.e., Xk = 1 if (xk,sk)
is revealing. Then εk = E[Xk] > ε and the average of Sm =
 m
k=1 Xk is
E[Sm] = E[X1 +     + Xm] = ε1 +    εm > mε = 2N .On the other hand, E[Sm] ≤ N + Pr[Sm > N]   2N
ε and thus Pr[Sm > N] > ε
2.
Therefore,with probabilitystrictly more than ε
2 there are N +1 revealingpairs (xk,sk)
computed by KA. As the commitment scheme is N-bounded,revealing pairs exist only
if n ≤ N. Hence, at least one slot must be overwrittenif there are N +1 revealing pairs
and we have found a double opening with probability strictly more than ε
2. ⊓ ⊔
Theorem 4 (Uniform security guarantee). Every (2Nt
ε , ε
2)-binding N-bounded set
commitment scheme is also (t, 2Nt
ε ,ε)-black-box secure time-stamping scheme.
Proof. The construction given above is also valid for set commitments. ⊓ ⊔
Comparisonwith previousresults. Ourreductionsarenotcompletelynovel.A similar
proof with a different reduction was given in [7] for hash trees. Therefore, we compare
the time-success ratios. Recall that the minimal time-success ratio α implies ε(t) ≤ t
α
and hence large ratios γ = α1
α0 lead to better security bounds.
In Thm. 1 we constructed a double opener with running time t0 ≈ 6t
√
N
ε and with
advantage ε0 ≈ ε
8, based on a back-dating adversary with running time t and advan-
tage ε. Thus the change ratio is γ ≈ ε
48
√
N for our reduction. If we adapt the reduction
presented in [7] for the exact security model we obtain a ratio γ ≈ ε
2N, which is sig-
niﬁcantly smaller for N ≥ 600. In global-scale time-stamping services, N can be very
large (say millions or even billions) and our new reduction by far supersedes the previ-
ous one [7].
Similarly, one can verify that γ ≈ ε
4N for Thm. 3 and Thm. 4 but the security
guaranteesaremuchstronger.To breakthe black-boxsecurityan adversarycan produce
valid document-certiﬁcate pairs with low computational R´ enyi entropy, which makes it
impossible to use the birthday paradox. It is easy to see that the extractor must work in
time Θ(Nt
ε ) and
√
N in the denominator is not achievable.
5 All Bounded Commitment Schemes are Knowledge-Binding
Both security deﬁnitions for time-stamping (Def. 1,2) are based on heuristic assump-
tions. Namely, the future is modeled as a computationally efﬁcient stochastic process.
Suchan assumptionhas two majordrawbacks.Firstly, it is philosophicallyquestionable
and causes practical problems in the classical framework of secure computations [11]:
due to the non-uniformnature of such model, future documents may have arbitrary dis-
tributions. Secondly, the success of back-dating adversaries is computed as an average
over the distribution of future documents and it might still be easy to “backdate”a ﬁxed
document. To overcome these problems, we propose a new security notion where the
future is modeled as an advice string that is independent of pk. The independence as-
sumption is essential. Otherwise, no computationally binding commitment scheme can
be secure, since the advice may contain explicit double-openings.Deﬁnition 3. A commitment scheme is (t,τ,ε)-knowledge-binding if for every t-time
adversary A = (A1,A2) there exist a dedicated τ-time extractor machine KA such that
Adv
k-bind(A) = max
adv
Pr



pk ← Gen, ω1 ←  , ˆ X ← KA(pk;ω1),
(c,n,φ) ← A1(pk;ω1),(x,s) ← A2(φ,adv) :
(Verpk(c,n,x,s) = true ∧ x  ∈ ˆ X) ∨ |ˆ X| > n


≤ ε ,
where adv varies over all advices of length t and the probability is taken over the coins
of Gen, A1 and A2. For list commitments, ˆ X is a list and write x ∈ ˆ X iff x = ˆ X[loc(s)].
The new deﬁnition explicitly states that there exists an efﬁcient extraction strategy
KA thatis able(byobservingtheinternalcomputationsofthecommittingalgorithmA1)
to predict any bit-string x that is later ”back-dated” by A2. I.e, in some sense x already
existed before the commitment and no real back-dating attacks were performed.
But there is an even more intuitive interpretation. When an adversary publishes a
commitment c, he implicitly ﬁxes his level of knowledge about the commitment and
no future actions can change it. As the level of knowledge does not change in time, a
successful opening “proves” that the adversary already “knew” the committed element
when the commitment was created. Hence, we can omit proofs of knowledge at the
commitmentstage and reduce the numberof rounds in various protocols.Thus, the new
notion is very similar to plaintext-awareness of public-key encryption schemes.
Finally, note that knowledge-binding is a necessary condition for the multi-party
security of time-stamping schemes. In the ideal implementation, TSS gives a list X to a
trusted party who will later serve partial release queries x ∈ X? Hence, there must be
an efﬁcient way to extract all documents that TSS can potentially open as a response
for any future message that is independent of pk, i.e., the extractor machine KA must
exist. To get multi-party security in the malicious model, we must also protect a honest
TSS against malicious clients. This can be done in an obvious way by using digital
signatures,but due to the space limitations we defer the discussionto follow-uparticles.
Clearly, the knowledge-binding property can be established only by using white-
box reductions. In other words, we cannot efﬁciently construct the code of KA given
onlythe codeof A, althoughKA itself is an efﬁcient algorithm.Such reductionsprovide
substantially weaker security guarantees for ﬁxed hash functions like SHA-1, since we
knowa priori thatefﬁcientcollision ﬁndersmustexist forSHA-1.Therefore,theclaims
of existence without efﬁcient construction strategies provide no new information. As a
result, we can only talk about the security of hash function families, i.e., we have to
consider SHA-1 as a “typical” representative of a collision-free hash function family.
The proofs consist of two main steps. First we analyze the behavior of A and con-
struct a dedicated knowledge extractor KA. Next we show that KA is efﬁcient and
Adv
k-bind(A) is sufﬁciently small. To construct KA, we run A on all possible inputs and
ﬁndsuitable triggeringmessages adv thatforceA to revealmostof thevalid certiﬁcates.
Next, we construct KA from A and the triggering messages. As the knowledge-binding
condition only requires the existence of KA, the construction time is not an issue.
Theorem 5. For every t > 0 and δ > 0, there exists τ = (N
δ +1) O(t) such that every
(τ,ε)-binding list commitment scheme is (t,τ,ε + δ)-knowledge binding.Proof. Fix a t-time adversary A and consider a giant status matrix W[pk,ω1;adv,ω2]
the rows of which are indexed by public keys pk and random coins ω1 of A1, whereas
the columns are indexed by t-bit advices adv and random coins ω2 of A2. Deﬁne
W[pk,ω1;adv,ω2] =
 
0, if Verpk(c,n,x,s) = false ,
loc(s), if Verpk(c,n,x,s) = true ,
where (c,n,φ) ← A1(pk;ω1) and (x,s) ← A2(φ,adv;ω2). Note that few columns
of W cover most of the rows containing non-zero elements. Namely, Lemma 1 from
App. A assures the existence of I =
 
(adv1,ω1
2),...,(advk,ωk
2)
 
such that |I| ≤ N
δ
and for any ﬁxed advice-randomness pair (adv,ω2):
Pr[(pk,ω1) : 0  = W[pk,ω1;adv,ω2]  ∈ L[pk,ω1] ∧ |L[pk,ω1]| < N] ≤ δ , (5)
where L[pk,ω1] = {W[pk,ω1;adv,ω2] : (adv,ω2) ∈ I} is a set of revealed locations.
Now the construction7 of KA is evident:
1. Given (pk,ω1) store (c,n,φ) ← A1(pk;ω1) and set ˆ X[i] = ⊥ for i ∈ {1,...,n}.
2. For each (adv,ω2) ∈ I do
– Compute (x,s) ← A2(φ,adv;ω2).
– If Verpk(c,n,x,s) = true then set ˆ X[loc(s)] ← x.
3. Output the last snapshot of ˆ X.
To analyze the advantage of KA, we ﬁx a pair (adv,ω2). Let (c,n,φ) ← A1(pk;ω1)
and (x,s) ← A2(φ,adv;ω2) as before. For valid decommitment value s, the entry
ˆ X[loc(s)] = ⊥ only if |L[pk,ω1]| < N and thus the inequality (5) given above yields
Pr[(pk,ω1) : Verpk(c,n,x,s) = true ∧ ˆ X[loc(s)] = ⊥] ≤ δ. Alternatively,KA can fail
if Verpk(c,n,x,s) = true but ˆ X[loc(s)]  = x. However, we can naturally combine
A1, A2 and KA into an adversary B that outputs these double openings and performs
(N
δ + 1)   O(t) elementary operations. Consequently, Adv
bind(B) ≤ ε and thus
Pr[(pk,ω1) : Verpk(c,n,x,s) = true ∧ x  = ˆ X[loc(s)]  = ⊥] ≤ ε .
As a result, we have obtained that for any pair (adv,ω2):
Pr[(pk,ω1) : Verpk(c,n,x,s) = true ∧ x  = ˆ X[loc(s)]] ≤ δ + ε
and the claim follows. ⊓ ⊔
Theorem 6. For every t > 0 and δ > 0, there exists τ = (N
δ +1) O(t) such that every
(τ,ε)-binding set commitment scheme is (t,τ,ε + δ)-knowledge-binding.
7 Note that all elements of the set I are hardwired as explicit constants into the code of KA, i.e.,
KA does not compute I. As KA runs on a universal Turing machine, it must rewind the code
of A2 and thus KA performs at most O(t) extra steps to complete the loop of Step 2.Proof. Fix a t-time adversary A and consider a status matrix W[pk,ω1;adv,ω2] that is
indexed identically to the previous proof but the entries are deﬁned differently:
W[pk,ω1;adv,ω2] =
 
0, if Verpk(c,n,x,s) = false ,
x, if Verpk(c,n,x,s) = true ,
where (c,n,φ) ← A1(pk;ω1) and (x,s) ← A2(φ,adv;ω2). Then Lemma 1 from
App. A assures the existence of I =
 
(adv1,ω1
2),...,(advk,ωk
2)
 
such that |I| ≤ N
δ
and for every ﬁxed advice-randomnesspair (adv,ω2):
Pr[(pk,ω1) : 0  = W[pk,ω1;adv,ω2]  ∈ L[pk,ω1] ∧ |L[pk,ω1]| < N] ≤ δ , (6)
where L[pk,ω1] = {W[pk,ω1;adv,ω2] : (adv,ω2) ∈ I} is a set of revealed elements.
Now the construction of KA is straightforward:
1. Given (pk,ω1) store (c,n,φ) ← A1(pk;ω1) and set ˆ X ← ∅.
2. For each (adv,ω2) ∈ I do
– Compute (x,s) ← A2(φ,adv;ω2).
– If Verpk(c,n,x,s) = true then add x to ˆ X.
3. Output the last snapshot of ˆ X.
To analyzethe advantageofKA, ﬁx(adv,ω2). Let (c,n,φ) ← A1(pk;ω1) and(x,s) ←
A2(φ,adv,ω2) as before.As ˆ X[pk,ω1] = L[pk,ω1] by the construction(see Lemma 1),
theinequality(6)yieldsPr[Verpk(c,n,x,s) = true ∧ x / ∈ ˆ X ∧ |ˆ X| < n ≤ N] ≤ δ.The
extractor KA can also fail when Verpk(c,n,x,s) = true but x / ∈ ˆ X and |ˆ X| ≥ n.
Again, we can naturally combineA1, A2 and KA into an adversaryB with running-time
(N
δ +1) O(t) that runs all algorithmsand extracts all validopenings.Consequently,the
restriction Adv
bind(B) ≤ ε yields Pr[Verpk(c,n,x,s) = true ∧ x / ∈ ˆ X ∧ |ˆ X| ≥ n] ≤ ε
and we have obtained that for any pair (adv,ω2):
Pr[Verpk(c,n,x,s) = true ∧ x / ∈ ˆ X] ≤ δ + ε
and the claim follows. ⊓ ⊔
Efﬁciency of the new reduction. Again, we compute time-success ratios to compare
the efﬁciency of the new white-box reduction to the previous black-box ones. To have
a fair comparison we take δ ≈ ε. Then Theorems 5 and 6 provide attacks against the
binding property with parameters t0 ≈ (N
δ + 1)t and ε0 = ε, provided that there
exist a t-time adversary achieving ε + δ success. As a result, we obtain a change ratio
γ = α1
α0 ≈ (N
δ + 1)−1   ε
ε+δ ≈ ε
2N, which is better than the change ratio γ ≈ ε
4N
provided by Thm. 3 and Thm. 4. The difference is not essential rather it comes from
slightly loose success bounds in Thm. 3 and Thm. 4.
6 Applications of Knowledge-Binding Commitments
Here,we brieﬂydescribehowknowledge-bindingcount-certiﬁedhash treescanbe used
and whyknowledge-bindingpropertyis important.Knowledge-bindingpropertycan beviewed as an indifference against outside advices. Similar to the plaintext-awareness,
the knowledge-binding property allows one to combine commitments with other cryp-
tographic primitives without a fear of unwanted interference. Such interference often
makes it hard or impossible to prove the security of new constructions. If the secret or
public parameters of other primitives are independent of the commitment parameters
pk, then the rest of the protocolcan be interpretedas an external advice.Hence, one can
use the standardhybridargumenttechniqueevenif the primitivesare used concurrently.
Distributed and ﬁne-grain time-stamping. Knowledge-binding commitments give
rise to a secure time-stamping service where a central time-stamping authority (TSS)
computes and publishes the roundcommitment(c,n) and distributes the respective cer-
tiﬁcates si to the clients. But such service is susceptible to denial-of-service attacks.
Hence, it is more natural to consider a distributed service where k independent servers
compute sub-commitments (ci,ni) and at the end of the round the master commitment
(c,n) is compiled. Therefore, it is advantageous to use knowledge-binding commit-
ments that facilitate fast mergingof sub-commitmentsand mostly local certiﬁcate com-
putations. Count-certiﬁed hash trees have the following important property: every root
node (ci,ni) of a hash subtree forms a correct commitment. Moreover, given two root
nodes (cL,nL) and (cR,nR) it is straightforward to compute the commitment of the
merged tree and update the corresponding certiﬁcates.
In a way, a set commitment scheme provides a really coarse-grain time-stamping
service. It is impossible to order the events inside the round X. List commitment pro-
vides only a partial solution, as clients have to trust that the TSS orders documents cor-
rectlyin asingle round.Tree-shapedlist commitmentsthatpreserveknowledge-binding
w.r.t. the rootof each subtreeallow also ﬁne-grainedtime-stampingevenif the TSS acts
maliciously. Essentially, TSS has to send to a Client all root commitments (ci,ni) of
all preceding computations, then the Client has strong guarantees that after submitting
his query the TSS cannot insert any messages in the preﬁx of the list without getting
caught. Hence, count-certiﬁed hash trees could be used for ﬁne-grain time-stamping.
Non-malleable partially releasable commitments. To show that knowledge-binding
commitments have other applications outside of the domain of time-stamping, we give
a construction of partially releasable non-malleable commitments form non-malleable
string commitments and knowledge-bindingcommitments. It is just an informal exam-
ple, we do not formalize the claim due to the lack of space.
Recall that a commitment scheme is non-malleable if given a commitment c it is
infeasible to construct a new commitment c′  = c such that after seeing a certiﬁcate
s for x it is infeasible to output a valid certiﬁcate s′ for x′ such that x and x′ are re-
lated. Let L = {c1,...,cn} be a list of non-malleablecommitments for x1,...,xn and
(C,D) ← Compk(L) is computed by using a knowledge-bindingcommitment scheme.
Then the resulting commitment scheme is non-malleable.From the knowledge-binding
property it follows that after seeing a proof that ci was computed by using xi, ad-
versary’s ability to output certiﬁcates (c,s) such that Pr[Ver(C,n,c,s) = true] does
not increase. Hence, the adversary knows all valid commitment-certiﬁcatepairs (ci,si)
essentially before any commitment is opened. Therefore, non-malleability directly fol-
lows from the non-malleability of the lower-level commitment.References
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A Combinatorial Extraction Lemma
Consider a ﬁnite matrix W[r;c] the rows of which are indexed by r ∈ R and the
columns are indexed by c ∈ C. Moreover, assume that a certain probability measure
Pr[ ] is deﬁned over the row indices R. Then it is straightforward to state and prove a
combinatorial lemma that we used for proving the knowledge-bindingproperty.
Lemma 1. For any δ > 0 and N ∈ N, there exist a set of column indices ∅ ⊆ I ⊆ C
such that 0 ≤ |I| ≤ N
δ and for every column c ∈ C :
Pr[r ← R : W[r;c]  = 0 ∧ W[r;c] / ∈ L[r] ∧ |L[r]| < N] ≤ δ ,
where L[r] = {W[r,c] : c ∈ I} \ {0} is the set of nonzero elements revealed by I.Proof. Consider following iterative procedure:
1. Set I = ∅ and initialise row counters cnt[r] = N for r ∈ R.
2. While exists c ∈ C such that Pr[r : W[r;c]  = 0] ≥ δ do
(a) Choose c such that Pr[r : W[r;c]  = 0] ≥ δ and insert c into I.
(b) For each row r ∈ R such that W[r;c]  = 0 do
– Store w ← W[r;c].
– Remove w entries from the row.
If W[r;c′] = w then W[r,c′] ← 0 for c′ ∈ C.
– Decrease counter cnt[r] ← cnt[r] − 1.
(c) Zero all rows where cnt[r] = 0.
– If cnt[r] = 0, set W[r;c′] ← 0 for c′ ∈ C.
Let N = {r : ∃W[r;c]  = 0} denote nonzero rows and Nold, Nnew denote the value of
N before and after update at Step 2. Let
 [N] =
 
r∈N
Pr[r]cnt[r]
be the average counter value. Then by the construction  [Nnew] ≤  [Nold] − δ after a
single iteration of Step 2. As initially  [N] ≤ N, then after ⌊N/δ⌋ iterations Pr[N] ≤
 [N] < δ. Note that the algorithm nulliﬁes the elements W[r,c′] only if they already
belong to L[r] or |L[r]| ≥ N. In the end, each column c contains at most a δ-fraction
of elements that satisfy the predicate W[r;c]  = 0 ∧ W[r;c] / ∈ L[r] ∧ |L[r]| < N and
the claim follows. Note that I can be empty. ⊓ ⊔
I = ∅ L I = {1} L I = {1,3} L I = {1,3} L
1 2 0 1 1 ∅
1 0 3 0 2 ∅
2 0 1 2 3 ∅
0 0 0 1 0 ∅
0 0 0 0 2 ∅
⇒
0 2 0 0 0 {1}
0 0 3 0 2 {1}
0 0 1 0 3 {2}
0 0 0 1 0 ∅
0 0 0 0 2 ∅
⇒
0 2 0 0 0 {1}
0 0 0 0 0 {1,3}
0 0 0 0 0 {2,1}
0 0 0 1 0 ∅
0 0 0 0 2 ∅
1 2 0 1 1 {1}
1 0 3 0 2 {1,3}
2 0 1 2 3 {1,2}
0 0 0 1 0 ∅
0 0 0 0 2 ∅
Fig.3. Illustration of Lemma 1. The ﬁrst three sub-ﬁgures show how the columns are selected
for the uniform distribution over the rows and for parameter values N = 2, δ = 0.3, boldface
symbols denote the changed values. The last sub-ﬁgure shows the ﬁnal result. Boldface symbols
denote the revealed entries. Underlined symbols denote the entries that satisfy the predicate.